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BOOK REVIEWS
MoRRIs ON TORTS. By Clarence Morris. Brooklyn: The Foundation Press,
Inc., 1953. Pp. xxviii, 384. $5.00.
A textbook on a legal subject usually consists of statements of principles and
xules of law supported by annotations at the bottom of the page. Professor
Morris' method of exposition is somewhat novel. He frequently introduces a sub-
ject with a very brief recital of the facts and decision of an important case.
This is followed by discussion of the rule of law and policy considerations under-
lying the decision. Descriptive names for plaintiff and defendant are frequently
used: such as, Mr. Angel and Mr. Imp; Mr. Pedestrian and Mr. Motorist; Mr.
Victim and Mr. Joker. This device helps one to follow the thread of the discus-
sion. Very brief abstracts of the more important cases found in recent casebooks
are woven into the text. These furnish the student an excellent orientation into
the discussion of the principles involved. In the first 339 pages there are only
85 footnotes and many of these are numerical citations of briefed cases.
The aim of the author can be gleaned from the preface: "This book is written
primarily for first year students taking a course in Torts.... Since some stress
is put on advocacy, the book may be of interest to young practicing lawyers ....
This is not a search book."' So far as first year students are concerned, the
author has without question accomplished his purpose. The discussion of the
general principles of the subject is both clear and interesting. It ought not to
be difficult to induce first year students to read such a book. It is, however, more
than a primer for students in the first year. The unusually full consideration
-of policy underlying decisions should be helpful to the practicing lawyer. In a
sense it is a search book for lawyers in marking out the limits in theory and
supplying an orientation into the search for case law.
Approximately half of the text is devoted to negligence, including a chapter
on the trends of personal injury litigation.2 The emphasis on procedure and
practice is important. Without this approach much of the law of negligence is
-confusing, if understandable at all. The approach to liability in terms of negli-
gence, proximate cause and duty is sufficiently explored to pinpoint some of the
-fallacies that exist:
When a defendant's conduct is unlikely to result in harm to anyone dis-
cussion of ambit of his non-existent liability may be confusing and almost
senseless.8
After referring to an Oregon case in which the court indulged in a long dis-
cussion of proximate cause Professor Morris remarks:
An abstract assumption of the railroad's fault without specifying what
constituted its fault often makes discussion of the ambit of responsibility
meaningless.4
These quotations are fundamental in the determination of liability. They are
selected for emphasis only because so many courts deal in terms of proximate
cause upon the assumption of negligence without any clear expression of why
or in what respect there is fault. In one excellent textbooku an attempt is made
to account for liability on the basis of negligence in the abstract, an expression
1. p. vii.
2. c. XIIL
3. 173.
4. Ibid.
5. 1 STRErT, FouNvATioNs or LEGAL LIAury 104 (1906).
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devoid of meaning. Even the famous Palsgraf case,6 which has recently been
revisited,7 might have been decided without invoking the doctrines of scope of
risk or proximate cause on the ground that the defendant's servants were not
at fault. Their assistance to a passenger who was in danger of serious bodily
harm so outweighed in social utility any risk of harm to property or to other
persons that the conduct appears entirely free from blame.$ If the conduct is
not blameworthy, what further reason is required to hold the defendant not
liable? There are many cases, however, in which minds may differ as to whether
the conduct complained of bears an unreasonable risk to the plaintiff's harm.
Here the scope of risk doctrine is of help. The particular actual cause is se-
lected as the basis of complaint because, it is believed, it includes the harm in
a way that makes the risk unreasonable.9 For no other reason is this actual
cause among many others selected. To say negligence is the proximate cause
of a harm means nothing more than that certain conduct is a necessary antece-
dent of the harm and that the conduct involves an unreasonable likelihood of
producing that harm. Actual cause plus risk equals liability. If that is what
proximate cause means, it is arrived at by addition and not by legal reasoning.
Under the topic Certainty of the Law on Scope of Liability Morris says:
The general rules of proximate cause do not tend to make the law certain
or the results of cases predictable. This uncertainty is not remedied when
the problem is discussed in terms of duty or negligence.10
As to the general rules of proximate cause there is no reason to question this
statement despite the vast amount of discussion, the probable purpose of which
was to attain these goals. However, the approach "in terms of duty or negli-
gence" seems to offer some measure of success. Otherwise, the study of cases in
this field seems futile. In many cases negligence, used as a term of relation and
in connection with the scope of risk doctrine, is helpful in deciding blameworthi-
ness and therefore liability. "In some cases specialized rules and precedents lay
a sound basis for prediction."" In support of this the author mentions liability
to a rescuer and the transfer of intent in some trespass actions. He then con-
tinues: "The list could be expanded to include hundreds of different kinds of
cases in which the doctrine of stare decisis has tended to settle the law."12 This
seems to be prediction on the basis of duty. Under the title Judge and Jury the
author says:
In some jurisdictions the duty approach is becoming increasingly popular,
though in no jurisdiction is it universally used to solve scope-of-liability
problems; in these jurisdictions the likelihood that a novel question of scope
of liability will be settled by the judge, rather than by the jury, is relatively
high."
Cases like Waube P. Warrington'4 support this view, but the duty approach
would seem to have its greatest use in cases with recurring factual situations. In
such cases verdicts and especially directed verdicts tend toward development of
rules of law.15 An example is the liability or non-liability of a carrier for loss of
6. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
7. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. Ruv. 1 (1953).
8. See Terry, Negligence in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF ToRS 261
(1924).
9. N. St. J. Green, Proximate and Remote Cause, ESSAYS ON TORT AND CRIME
1 (1933).
10. p. 192.
11. bid.
12. p. 193.
13. p. 206.
14. 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
15. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 123, 124 (1938).
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goods by the concurrence of an extraordinary flood and the carrier's unreason-
able delay.
In the field of misrepresentation the author disagrees with Bohlen's view of
no liability for negligently giving false information if the defendant acts gratui-
tously. Bohlen used the analogy of supplying defective chattels in which the
supplier's only duty is to act in good faith.16 The author prefers the analogy of
liability of one who negligently harms another while trying to render gratuitous
assistance, such as taking another to a hospital after a collision of automobiles.
When a housewife asks a former employer about the honesty of a servant
looking for work, or when a life insurance underwriter asks an applicant's
acquaintance about the applicant's sobriety, the inquirer expects only in-
formation already at hand. If the answer tells all the speaker knows, the
speaker is not negligent in knowing no more than he does. But if he answers
in negligent haste failing to use due care to marshal his knowledge, or if he
draws unreasonable conclusions without stating the data on which he bases
them, or if he negligently uses language meaning the opposite of what he
is trying to say, he does a sloppy job of performing his undertaking and
deserves liability.1-
An analogy that supports Bohlen's view is found in the law of defamation. If
A applies to E for employment and E seeks information as to A's honesty from
D, A's former employer, D, may, if he falsely states that A is dishonest, subject
himself to a suit in defamation by A. But D has a conditional privilege that will
protect him in the absence of malice which includes either recklessness or know-
ledge of the falsity of the statement. Negligence on the part of D will not make
him liable. One compensated for giving information, such as a commercial
agency, may be liable for defamation on the ground of negligence or possibly
at its peril. But D gives the information as an accommodation. If D knew he
could be liable in defamation if he could be proved negligent in making a reply,
he would not take the risk and no information would be given. This would
defeat the policy underlying conditional privileges in such situations. If D
falsely replies that A is trustworthy and E, relying on this, employs A with
subsequent loss through A's dishonesty, E may sue D for misrepresnetation.
What kind of conduct should make D liable? Here, again, D would likely make
no reply if he understood negligence would support liability. In this situation
D ought to be able to act without fear of being sued for defamation or for mis-
representation if he acts honestly. Otherwise, whatever value there is in acting
on gratuitous information would disappear because the information would not
be forthcoming.
This book, as a whole, is an excellent production. It clearly presents the
general principles of torts. It does not deal with detailed application to minor
points. But the discussion of policy beneath the general principles furnishes a
background for such detailed application. The book should be well received by
students, teachers and practicing lawyers.
GEORGE B. WEISIERt
16. Bohlen, Misrepresentation As Deceit, Negligence or Warranty, 42 HAIv.
L. REV. 733 (1929).
17. p. 265, 266.
t Professor of Law, College of Law, University of Illinois.
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